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United States 
of America 
<tongressional Record 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93 d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 
Vol. 120 WASHINGTON,. TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1974 No. 55 
Senate 
ARMS REDUCTION, DETENTE 
AND SALT 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as 
Senator JACKSON said in his address of 
April 22 to the Overseas Press Club: 
The issue facing us is not whether we want 
a detente, but how to achieve a real detente 
that will produce results favorable to a more 
peaceful world. 
We are now negotiating with the So-
viets in SALT II, and the outcome of 
these negotiations can decisively affect 
the real meaning detente will have. I 
believe it is of the utmost importance 
that SALT II follow a course that is con-
sistent with the national security of the 
United States and the prospects for a 
SALT II treaty based on United States-
Soviet equality. 
In this spirit, Senator JACKSON has set 
forth a U.S. SALT proposal to stabilize 
the strategic balance through substan-
tial reductions in the strategic forces of 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. As he said: 
It is time for serious arms reductions ty 
both sides-a stabilizing disarmament. 
I wish to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues the full text of Senator 
JACKSON's constructive and statesman-
like address. I urge the widest reading 
of his remarks. If agreed to, Senator 
JACKSON's program would mark an his-
toric turning point in East-West rela-
tions, and could dramatically increase 
the confidence of all the world's people 
in the prospects for a cooperative and 
stable peace. 
I ask unanimous consent that the full 
text of Senator JACKSON's address be 
printed in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the address 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
DETENTE AND SALT 
(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON) 
In recent years, and especially in recent 
months, the foreign policy of the Nixon Ad-
ministration has been centered on the de-
velopment of a relationship between East 
and West which they have called detente. No 
matter how hard or in which direction it has 
been punched-in the Middle East, in the 
SALT negotiations, on matters of human 
rights-the foreign policy of the Administra-
tion has revolved, like a tether ball, around 
the pole of that detente. 
The detente hns gone from a dream to an 
incantation Wltnout acquiring a definition 
along the way. And we have been left without 
a clear sense of where we are going or, for 
that matter, a common understanding of 
where we have been. 
In its most fundamental sense detente 
must mean a relaxation of tensions ac-
companied by an effort to achieve mutual 
accommodation through the negotiating 
process. Defined in this manner, as a process 
'of negotiation, it has the broad support of 
til e American people. But like any process, 
the process of detente must be judged by the 
substantive results of the negotiations them-
selves and by the actual behavior that follows 
after agreements are negotiated. 
Thus the issue facing us is not whether we 
want a deteu:;e, but how to act.teve a real 
:l:: tente that will produce results favorable 
to !'\ more peaceful world. 
The centerpiece oi the 1972 Moscow sum-
mit and the first test of the product of 
detente was the treaty on anti-ballistic mis-
siles and the interim agreement on strategic 
of!'ensive weapons-SALT I. I had consider-
able misgivings about the SALT I outcome, 
esnecially the interim agreement. The mili-
ta.·y advantage that the interim agreement 
conferred on the Soviets was, in my judg-
ment, an inauspicious beginning. 
Now we are engaged in SALT rr; and it is 
this set of negotiations, perhaps more than 
any other, that will determine what real 
meaning detente will have. I welcome this 
opportunity to sha~·e with you a proposal 
that could stabilize the strategic balance 
through substantial reductions in the strate -
gic forces of both the United St::ttes and the 
Soviet Union. In the course of my remarks 
tonight, which are directed to the SALT II 
negotiations, I have tried to develop a new 
direction in the effort to bring strgtegic arms 
under control-a direction based on the 
search for the sort of wide-rang111g disarma-
ment that would do much to bring us closer 
to a genuine detente and a more peacefuL 
world 
In recent months we have seen the de-
Velopment by the Soviet Union of a signifi-
cant number of new weapon systems in-
corporating· an impressive range of new and 
costly technology. Not only have the Soviets 
achieved a genuine MIRV capability, but 
they have done so by developing two quite 
distinct MIRV technologies. They have tested 
a whole new generation of intercontinental 
~allistic missiles, land and sea based, in-
corporating new technologies as well as new 
launch techniques. They have developed a 
mobile, land-based ICBM. They have moved 
to increase by a very substantial factor the 
throw weight of their missile forces despite 
tre fact that they already enjoy a threefold 
advantage in this area. These developments, 
all of which have come to light since the 
SALT interim agreement which was sup-
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posed to limit offensive weapons, have, in- 2 
dlvldually and in comt·inrttion, added signifi-
·cantly to the offensive potential of the S:JViet 
missile forces. 
In assessing th8 si gnificance _of these de-
velopments, all of which are consistent with 
:the often ambiguous terms of the SALT 
'interim agreement, io is necessary to digress 
.for a mament to consider the rationale by 
which the interim agreement was defended. 
The numerical disadvantage into which 
the United States was frozen by the SALT 
I Interim agreement was held by some to be 
effectively offset by our technological su-
periority. The most obvious American tech-
nological advantage-obvious in part because 
of the frequency with which Dr. Kissinger 
reiterated it-lay in the fact that we had 
achieved a MIRV capability and the Soviet 
Union had not. Today our monopoly in MIRV 
technology has vanisher! like last year's snow 
and the lead in this area that we still possess 
by virt.ue of our earlier development of 
MIRVs can be expected to diminish rapidly 
as time goes on. This Is neither novel nor 
surprising. In the long run-made longer if 
we find ourselves forced into a technological 
arms race and shorter if we do not-tech-
nology tends to even out. That is the history 
of technology; and it is, in particular, the 
history of military technology. Given the 
numbers and throw weights agreed to in the 
SALT I interim agreement, under which the 
Soviets enjoy a protected advantage, tech-
nological equality will mean Soviet superior-
Ity in strategic weapons. 
In the final analysis, an arms control 
agreement will not be stable if it freezes 
for one side an advantage in quantity while 
the other has to rely on an edge in quality 
that it cannot maintain. In the interim 
·agreement we agreed to Inferior numbers 
but the Soviets did not agree to inferior 
technology. We should never have pre-
sumed-I, for one, did not-that they would 
fall to seek the combination of superior 
numbers and comparable technology that 
add up to overall superiority; and this is 
precisely the direction that they have chosen. 
In the current SALT II negotiations the 
Soviets are seeking to consolidate the ad-
vantage they obtained in the interim agree-
ment while pressing for equality in tech-
nology. Again and again when the interim 
agreement was before the Senate I warned 
that this would be the Soviet strategy at 
SALT II. My amendment to the authoriza-
tion for the Interim agreement placed the 
Congress and the Administration on record 
on this Issue by insisting that the interim 
agreement was not an acceptable basis for a 
SALT II treaty. 
Now. with negotiations underway, we find 
that, just as expected, the Soviets have ac-
tually hardened their position. Far from 
viewing SALT II as an occasion to search 
for the sort of stable strategic balance that 
can result only from equality, they are in-
sisting on a SALT II arrangement that would 
widen and deepen their strategic margin still 
further. 
The response of the Administration to this 
situation has been disappointing in the ex-
treme. For rather than concentrating on thf' 
design and presentation of an arms control 
proposal that could form the basis for a 
long-term stabilization of the strategic bal-
ance, the Administration bas concentrated 
on quick-fix, short term proposals that can 
be readied In time for the forthcoming June 
summit meeting in Moscow. 
In their desire to oreserve the imoression 
of momentum in the SALT negotiations, the 
Administration has abandoned its previous 
conviction that the essential purpose of a 
follow-on agreement should be to rectify the 
imbalance of SALT I. In their haste to meet 
an arbitrary and politically expedient self-
imposed June deadline, the Administration 
bas now begun to entertain Soviet proposals 
which are inimical to the national security of 
the United States and to the prospects for a 
Sl.LT IJ treaty based on U.S.-Soviet equality. 
Kept on such a course, SALT II is doomed 
to fail in the supreme mission of reducing 
the risk of mutual destruction. Indeed, in-
stead of putting a damper on the arms race, 
such a failure would add fuel to the fire. 
Given this situation, I am persuaded the 
time is ripe for the United States to put for-
ward a bold and imaginative proposal for 
serious disarmament-a proposal that will 
test uncertain Soviet intentions by inviting 
them to join with us in concluding a far-
reaching agreement to bring about a measure 
of stability in the nuclear balance 'l.t sharply 
reduced levels of strategic forces. 
Instead of arms limitation agreements that 
do not limit, it is time for serious arms re-
ductions by both sides-a stabilizing dis-
armament. 
In outlining my proposal it is useful to be· 
gin by recalling the numbers agreed to under 
the terms of the SALT I interim agreement, 
according to which the United States may 
have no more than 1,054 intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. This force consists prin-
cipally of Minuteman missiles that are 
termed "light" (in contrast to "heavy") un-
der the definitions worked out in conjunction 
with the interim agreement. For their part, 
the Soviets are permitted 1,618 intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles of which approl\."i-
mately 1,300 are of the "light" variety. The 
other · 300 Soviet ICBMs are "heavy"-so 
heavy, in fact, that these 300 alone carry as 
much "throw weight" as the entire permitted 
U.S. force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Wit!' 
respect to the Soviet missile force the terms 
"light" and "heavy" are misleading because 
the missile that the Soviets apparently in-
tend to deploy as a substitute in the "light" 
category for the missiles in that category at 
the time of the interim agreement are several 
times more powerful, several times "heavier" 
than our comparable systems. 
At sea the interim agreement provides that 
the United States may have up to 44 missile-
firing nuclear submarines containing 710 
launch tubes. The Soviets are permitted up 
to 62 comparable submarines, with 950 
launch tubes, in addition to a number of 
older type submarines. The Soviets are now 
engaged In building up to these levels. 
I believe that strategic forces on both sides 
are larger than they need to be, provided that 
we can negotiate with the Soviets toward a 
cammon ceiling at a sharply lower level. 
'l he ref ore I propose that we invite the Soviets 
to consider a SALT II agreement In which 
~ach side would be limited to 800 ICBMs and 
to no more than 560 submarine-launched 
missiles, equivalent to 35 rnissile-fil'in"' sub-
marines of the Poseidon type. Longo range 
strategic bombers, which were not included 
under the interim agreement, would also be 
limited to 400 on each side. Because the 
throw weight of the Soviet missile force is so 
much greater than that of our own, the two 
SALT delegations would be instructed to 
negotiate a formula for varying these basic 
numbers so as to bring the throw weight of 
the two intercontinental strategic forces into 
approximate equallty. 
The numbers resulting from the negotiat 
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ing process need not be precisely the numbers 3 are not negotiable is premature; and there 
outlined here, although I believe that signlfi- are many who do not share this Judgment. 
cant variation from these numbers, if essen- After all, It was Henry Kissinger himself, who 
tlal to successful negotiation, QUght to move warned-in his book The Necessity jot 
in the direction of further reductions rather Choice-that to reject sound proposals be-
than upward adjustments. Because the stra· cause they appeared to be non-negotiable 
tegic forces of the countries are structurea was to acquiesce in negotiating on Soviet 
differently at present and because we are al- terms. 
ways searching for ways in which to reduce Some weeks ago I urged the President to 
the potential vulnerability of our deterrent. consider the program that I have outlined 
the treatv need not follow the precise num- here tonight. The response has not been en-
hers for each type of weapon system I have couraging. The refusal of the Administration 
suggested--so long as .the aggregate total of to consider seriously a program for Soviet-
intercontinental strategic launchers was American force reductions Is as dlsappolnt-
1,760 or less. Reductions to a level of equality ing as the tendency to seek a quick cosmetic 
would be carried out, in phases, over a pe- agreement in June is dangerous. 
riod of time to be negotiated. There is no critical point for negotiations 
A treaty renecttng tne essential features 
that I have outlined here would represent 
a real and significant step in the direction 
of stabilizing disarmament. It would put to 
rest many of the misgivings that we now 
have that the Soviets are seeking to attain 
strategic superiority by consolidating their 
advantage in SALT I. It would permit both 
sides to shift their resources from the build-
ing up of nuclear arsenals to the building 
up of their economies. 
The Sovtet Union has turned to the United 
States for economic assistance, for our capi-
tal, our agricultural produce and our ad-
vanced technology. So long as the Soviets 
support the greatly exaggerated military sec-
tor of their economy at anything approaching 
current levels, an American program of sub-
sidized economic transactions and the ~rans ­
fer of sophisticated technology, whatever its 
intended purpose, wlll inevitably amount to 
aid to the Russian army, naval and air forces . 
At a time when the Soviet economy Is In 
great difficulty we oug~t to be able to per-
suade them that a reordering of their prior-
ities away from the military sector Is the 
best way to achieve economic well-being. 
Adoption of my proposal could be an impor-
tant step along a path that could lead even-
tually to bllllons of dollars in savings on 
strategic weapons systems. 
It would enable us both to reorder our 
priori ties. 
If agreed to, It would mark a turning point 
in U.S.-Soviet relations of historic propor-
tions. It would carry us to the brink of peace 
Such an accord could transform the atmos-
phere of mistrust and apprehension that has 
clouded the horizon of East-West relation ': 
since the end of World War II. It would add 
Immeasurably to the confidence of both our 
peoples, indeed, of all mankind, that the grim 
prospect of thermonuclear war can be set 
aside and our energies devoted to purposes 
more constructive and more enduring than 
the amassing of the weapons of war. It would 
be, if ever there was one, a genuine concep-
tual breakthrough. 
In the new and more hopeful world that 
would result, we could look forward to a 
broadening of the foundation of mutual ac-
commodation, a deepening of the spirit of 
cooperation In trade and commerce, science 
and technology and the arts, and In the freer 
movement of people and Ideas. 
This is a program for the beginning of a 
more peaceful world. It is worthy of our best 
efforts. And I am committed to do whatever 
I can to bring it about. 
I am under no illusion about the difficulty 
of negotiating an arms reduction agreement 
along the lines outlined here. It wlll take 
time and bard bargaining. The view of some 
In the Administration that force reductions 
that wm be passed if June comes and goes 
without a follow-on SALT arrangement. 
There is nothing unique about the month 
of June that would justify an extension of 
the SALT I interim agreement and th0reby 
legitimize Its tertns beyond 1977 and prej-
udice the prospects for a meaningful and 
stabilizing SALT II treaty. 
I am not content to let the mat ter rest 
upon the complex and multi-purpose judg-
ments of an embattled WJ:Hte House. or with 
a Department of State whose passion for mo-
mentum Is sometimes Indifferent to the di-
rection in which It Is headed. I have today 
requested, as Chairman of the Arms Control 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, that the Secretary of De-
fense undertake an Immediate and thorough 
assessment of my arms reduc tion proposal 
for transmission to the Subcommittee. 
Adoption of this proposal would m ark a 
radical departure from the tentat ive and of-
ten marginal approach to arms control that 
we have followed in SALT. Reduction s on the 
scale I am proposing will encounter opposi-
tion , not least of all from t h ose In t h e mili-
tary services whose training, experience and 
orientat ion are likely to militat e against 
strategic force reductions in genera l, and ex-
tensive reductions In particular . While It 
would be imprudent to discard the p rofes-
sional judgment of the military and irre-
sponsible to Ignore t heir advice, I believe 
that we must not allow their skep t icism w 
stand In the way of a proposal wh ich wlll en-
hance our security_ 
I am confide n t that American m ili tary 
planners can be persuaded of t he advantages 
of bilateral cutbacks In strategic weapons 
and that they too, In the final analysis , re-
flect the hopes we all share for a more sta-
ble strategic balance and a more peaceful 
world. I would hope that the Soviet military, 
which has been unreceptive to proposals 
such as this In the past, would give careful 
consideration to the promise of a better life 
for the Soviet people, who could be freed 
from part of the enormous burden of the 
arms they now bear. Here the job of persua -
sion must fall to the Politburo, and to them 
~ am simply saying: Let us break with .the 
troubled past and seek a more fruitful and 
secure future for both our peoples . 
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